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Abstract: In this paper, we present experiments designed to assess the role of causal connectives with an attributive 
meaning (e.g. since and puisque) on the acceptability of straw man fallacies. Our results show that connectives 
play a role for the detection of straw man fallacies by increasing readers’ awareness to the speaker’s persuasive 
intent, thus creating a forewarning effect. We also uncover a crucial difference between causal connectives both 
within and across languages. Taken together, our experiments plead in favor of conducting fine-grained analyses 
of connectives in different languages in order to deepen our understanding of their role for argumentation. 
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1. Introduction 
The study of connectives, and discourse markers in general, through the lens of argumentation 
is an established field. Yet, the influence of connectives for the acceptability of fallacies, and 
on argumentation more generally, has not empirically been assessed. In argumentation, 
discourse markers – a broad category that includes connectives – have been discussed from 
various theoretical perspectives (e.g. Anscombre & Ducrot, 1983; Eemeren, Houtlosser & 
Snoeck Henkemans, 2007a, 2007b). Whereas Anscombre and Ducrot (1983) suggest an 
approach that theorizes the role of argumentation embedded in language, the pragma-
dialecticians (Eemeren et al., 2007b) offer a more general approach including connectives, 
discourse markers and other expressions and their relation to argumentative moves. What these 
approaches do not consider, however, is the different role played by specific connectives, as 
the latter may well vary depending on the type of coherence relation they encode, or as we 
argue here, their level of subjectivity. The straw man lends itself particularly well for linguistic-
oriented experimental testing. The characteristics of a straw man that make it a fallacious 
argument rest on the linguistic structure used to perform it, since the distortion of the original 
position is considered an essential feature of this fallacy (see e.g. Aikin & Casey, 2016; Oswald 
& Lewiński, 2014). Manipulating the linguistic form of the straw man by using different causal 
connectives to introduce the fallacious argument therefore represents an opportunity to 
investigate the role of linguistic markers and their impact on fallacies. In order to better 
understand the linguistic characteristics of connectives that may impact their role for the 
communication of fallacies, studies in the field of pragmatics and discourse processing need to 
be considered, as they have provided extensive data on the role of connectives for 
communication and cognition over the past decades. Yet, these studies have mostly considered 
the role of connectives in descriptive rather than argumentative contexts. This paper aims at 
filling the gap between more linguistic-oriented contributions and the more argumentative-
oriented study of fallacies. It also contributes to a better understanding of causal connectives in 
argumentative context from a cross-linguistic perspective. 
 
2. The straw man fallacy 
The study of fallacies has become a mainstay in argumentation theory over the past decades 
(Hamblin, 1970; Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; Hansen & Pinto, 1995; Walton, 1995; 
Tindale, 2007). Research specifically focusing on the straw man fallacy however, has mostly 
increased in more recent years (Aikin & Casey, 2011, 2016; Lewiński, 2011; Lewiński & 
Oswald, 2013; Oswald & Lewiński, 2014; Saussure, 2018), even if pragma-dialecticians have 
theorized it to some extent in the 1990s (Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; Eemeren & 
Houtlosser, 1999). Most of these studies have tackled the subject from several different 
normative and/or descriptive perspectives. Whereas pragma-dialectics focus on a normative 
approach, defining the straw man fallacy as a violation of the third rule for critical discussion 
(Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, 2002; 
Eemeren et al., 2014), other researchers like Aikin and Casey (2011; 2016) opt for a more 
descriptive approach, highlighting that there are several forms of the fallacy including a straw 
man, a weak man, a hollow man and an iron man. Oswald and Lewiński (2014) characterize 
the elements of the straw man fallacy combining findings from pragma-dialectics and relevance 
theory, and Saussure (2018) describes the fallacy from a more ethical and rhetorical perspective. 
But in general, all approaches describe the straw man in a similar way, defining it as a 
misrepresentation of an original position in order to more easily refute that position (see e.g. 
Aikin & Casey, 2011, 2016; Eemeren et al., 2014; Oswald & Lewiński, 2014; Saussure, 2018). 
An essential aspect that characterizes the straw man is therefore the misrepresentational element 
which is related to the linguistic structure (e.g. the use of connectives to introduce an argument, 
the segmentation of the discourse elements, etc.) which is used to convey the informational 
content. Many such linguistic structures lend themselves for empirical testing. 
Fallacies are increasingly studied from an experimental point of view (Eemeren, Garssen & 
Meuffels, 2012; Hahn & Hornikx, 2016; Harris, Han, Madsen & Hsu, 2016; Lillo-Unglaube, 
Canales-Johnson, Navarrete & Fuentes Bravo, 1996; Ozols, Maillat & Oswald, 2016), but to 
our knowledge, only one study has empirically assessed the persuasiveness of the straw man 
fallacy. Bizer, Kozak and Holterman (2009) conducted two experiments in which they tested if 
individual personality traits like personal relevance and the need for cognitive closure affect the 
persuasiveness of the straw man. Bizer et al. (2009) report that participants in a high-relevance 
condition (content presented was important to the hearer) are less likely to be persuaded by the 
straw man fallacy. They also found that participants with a high need for cognitive closure 
(elevated decisiveness) are more likely to be persuaded because they want to get to a conclusion 
more quickly. These experiments have demonstrated that the straw man fallacy can indeed be 
influenced by cognitive factors such as individual differences in personality traits. 
It emerges from this overview that no studies, theoretical or experimental, have targeted specific 
linguistic elements that influence the acceptability of the straw man fallacy. In previous 
research (Schumann, Zufferey & Oswald, 2019) we demonstrated that, amongst other factors, 
using the causal connective puisque to introduce the fallacious argument, leads to a lower 
acceptability of the straw man. We explained this effect by the observation that puisque 
frequently indicates a given information towards which the speaker often conveys a tacitly 
dissociative attitude (Zufferey, 2014). This means that by using the connective to introduce an 
argument, the hearer’s awareness towards the fallacious misrepresentation of the original 
position is raised. These results begged the questions whether other causal connectives that also 
convey attributive meaning lead to similar results or not and whether such connectives behave 
alike across languages. We investigate this issue further in this paper. 
3. Linguistic and psycholinguistic descriptions of connectives 
What lacks in argumentative approaches to connectives is in an integration of the level of detail 
that is found in linguistic and psycholinguistic studies, as we now outline. In these studies, 
causal connectives are defined as linguistic units used to establish causal relations between 
discourse segments, increasing textual coherence and structuring discourse (Halliday & Hassan, 
1976; Knott & Dale, 1994; Mann & Thompson, 1988). They do facilitate discourse processing 
by instructing the hearer on how to interpret an utterance (Blakemore, 2002; Caron, Micko & 
Thüring, 1988; Cozijn, Noordmann & Vonk, 2011; Sanders et al., 2007; Zufferey & Gygax, 
2016). However, they are usually optional, as discourse relations can also be left implicit and 
reconstructed by inference. For example, in (1) the connective since is used to indicate that the 
segment following the connective is to be understood as a justification of the preceding 
segment. By contrast, in (2), the meaning remains exactly the same when those two segments 
are simply juxtaposed. 
(1) The fridge is empty since she ate all the food. 
(2) The fridge is empty. She ate all the food. 
The same causal relation can also be expressed by other connectives like given that, illustrated 
in (3), or as, illustrated in (4). 
(3) The fridge is empty given that she ate all food. 
(4) The fridge is empty as she ate all the food. 
In examples (1), (3) and (4) the causal relation is formulated explicitly by using a connective, 
whereas in (2) this relation must be inferred. However, the same connective, can express 
different relations like it is the case for as. In (5) the connective as introduces a temporal 
relation: 
(5) She realized there was no food left as she opened the fridge. 
In this case, as is used to show that both actions happen simultaneously. The above-mentioned 
examples demonstrate that causal connectives have a variety of functions, but it is necessary to 
differentiate them according to their specific nuances. 
The number of studies that have assessed the role of connectives for discourse processing and 
understanding by inserting them in an argumentative context is very limited. To our knowledge, 
only one study by Kamalski, Lentz, Sanders and Zwann (2008) has investigated the difference 
between subjective causal connectives that are used to link claims and conclusion in the mind 
of the speaker (6) and objective causal connectives that are used to link facts and events in the 
real world (7).  
(6) Her fridge must be empty since she has eaten out the whole week. 
(7) Her fridge is empty because she has not been grocery shopping for a week. 
In a first study, they found that participants were more likely to be persuaded when the texts 
contained objective connectives rather than subjective connectives because the latter act as 
forewarners, altering readers to the speakers’ persuasive intention, making them more critical 
towards its content. The results of their second experiment confirmed the existence of a 
forewarning effect related to subjective connectives even further. They were able to show that 
short texts containing subjective connectives were less persuasive than texts with no connective. 
The study conducted by Kamalski et al. (2008) has shown that subjective connectives do indeed 
create a forewarning effect. However, their notion of subjectivity is not as fine-grained as 
suggested by other researchers. Degand and Pander Maat (2003) define subjectivity as a scalar 
notion and other researchers like Pit (2007) and Zufferey and Cartoni (2012) have shown that 
not every connective expresses the same degree of subjectivity. In contrast, Kamalski et al. 
(2008) used a list of connectives but did not make more fine-grained differences between them. 
 
In this paper, we pursue this line of investigation further by assessing whether differences 
related to the specific characteristics of different causal connectives in English and French 
impact on the acceptability of straw man fallacies. To assess the roles of every connective, we 
focus on 4 factors: subjectivity, givenness, polyfunctionality and preferential placement. For 
the experiments in French we worked with the connectives puisque, étant donné que and comme 
which are all used to express a causal relation that encodes an attributive meaning. According 
to the LEXCONN data base of French connectives (Roze, Danlos & Muller, 2012), puisque is 
a causal connective that can be used to convey objective, as well as subjective content. 
However, in a contrastive corpus study Zufferey and Cartoni (2012) have shown that 58.5% of 
the occurrences are related to the communication of subjective causal relations expressing given 
information. Puisque therefore qualifies as a subjective connective which, in addition, is often 
used to convey a tacitly dissociative attitude towards the expressed content. This makes it an 
interesting connective to investigate from the perspective of the straw man fallacy which relies 
on a misattribution content. The LEXCONN data base (Roze et al., 2012) does not indicate a 
preferential placement for the connective, it is equally used in sentence medial and sentence 
initial position. 
The second causal connective with attributive meaning we focus on for the experiments is étant 
donné que. According to a contrastive study conducted by Zufferey and Cartoni (2012), this 
connective is used to conveyed both objective and subjective relations. The LEXCONN data 
base (Roze et al., 2012) comes to the same conclusion: étant donné que can express both types 
of causal links. Like in the case of puisque, étant donné que indirectly conveys the information 
that the content following the connective is shared by the participants of the discussion which 
creates and echoic meaning. Étant donné que has no polyfunctional value and no preferential 
position (Roze et al., 2012). 
There are no corpus studies specifically focusing on the causal connective comme, but in the 
LEXCONN data base, comme is listed as a connective that can convey subjective as well as 
objective information. Like in both previous cases, comme has an echoic meaning, indicating 
the content following the connective as shared information. Comme is a highly polyfunctional 
connective that has different uses. According to LEXCONN (Roze et al., 2012) it can express 
causality, as well as temporal relations or indicate similarities and parallels. Compared to the 
previous connectives, comme has a preferential placement and is more frequently used in 
sentence initial position (Roze et al., 2012). However, this does not mean that comme is 
ungrammatical or unacceptable in sentence medial position – it is just less frequently used in 
this position. 
 
For the experiments in English, we selected the closest equivalents of the French connectives, 
namely since (for puisque), given that (for étant donné que) and as (for comme). For the 
connective since, Zufferey & Cartoni (2012) report that in 41% of the cases, since was used to 
communicate subjective and given content, and in 51% of the cases subjective and new content. 
According to the Eng-DiMLex data base (Das, Scheffler, Bourgonje & Stede, 2018), since not 
only expresses a causal relation but it can also convey temporally related information, meaning 
that the connective has a polyfunctional value. The Eng-DiMLex data base (Das et al., 2018) 
does not indicate a preferential placement for the connective, it is equally used in sentence 
initial and sentence medial position. 
Following the Eng-DiMLex (Das et al., 2018) the connective given that is a causal connective 
used to introduce subjective and objective information, and it is more often associated with 
given information. The connective is non-polyfunctional and does not have a preferential 
position. For given that there are no specific corpus studies focusing on the different functions 
of the connective. 
For as, Zufferey and Cartoni (2012) have shown in their contrastive corpus study that the 
connective is mostly used to convey subjective and new information (51%), only in 25% of the 
cases it was used to convey subjective and given information. According to the Eng-DiMLex 
data base (Das et al., 2018) as is a highly polyfunctional connective that can be used to express 
different types of links like causal or temporal relations, and event similarities. 
The table below contains an overview of the most important features of each connective. 
Table 1: Main features of the connectives tested in the experiments 
 Subjective or objective 
Given or new Polyfunctionality Preferential 
placement 
Puisque Strongly subjective More given  No No 
Étant donné que Both  More given  No No 
Comme Both  Both Yes Initial 
Since Strongly subjective  More new  Yes No 
Given that Both  More given No No 
As More subjective  More new  Yes No 
 
We can conclude from this overview that, even if they all express a causal relation, the 
connectives differ in some of the features within the same language. For the French connectives, 
we notice that puisque has a very strong subjective feature compared to the other two 
connectives and comme seems to be less strongly subjective and not as often used to convey 
given information. Looking at the English causal connectives, we notice that since and as 
appear to share more features compared to given that. We also see that the cross-linguistic 
connective-pairs (puisque + since / étant donné que + given that / comme + as) are not identical 
in their features across languages. 
4. Testing the influence of causal connectives for the acceptability of straw man 
fallacies in French and English 
In the following experiments, we investigated the role of the English and French connectives 
described above for the acceptability of straw men. We pursued three main objectives for these 
experiments. First, we wanted to assess whether straw man fallacies are more detected when 
the fallacious segment is introduced with a connective, or when it is simply juxtaposed to the 
previous segment. In light of the results from our previous research (Schumann et al., 2019) 
and the forewarning effect put forward by Kamalski and colleagues (2008) we expect that 
arguments introduced with a subjective connective should be less accepted compared to 
arguments that are simply juxtaposed to the previous segment. Second, we wanted to 
demonstrate that different connectives lead to different effects, which contributes to explain 
why they are rarely interchangeable in a given language. We expect that connectives with a 
very strongly subjective meaning like puisque will lead to a lower acceptability score than less 
strongly subjective connectives like comme in French or as in English. Third, we expect that, 
even if there exist very close translation equivalents between languages, connectives are in fact 
not fully equivalent across languages. The experiments were structured following the same 
experimental design as in our previous research (Schumann et al., 2019). We summarize the 
methodology of these studies below. We then present results for the pair of connectives made 
of puisque and its closest English counterpart since, then move on to the pair made of étant 
donné que and given that, and finally we report results for the pair made of comme and as. 
a. Participants 
For the experiments in French, we recruited 123 French-speaking participants (94 women, 
mean age: 26, age range: 18-57) and for the experiments in English, we recruited 123 English-
speaking participants (79 women, mean age: 35, age range: 18-75). All participants were 
recruited via the University of Fribourg and the crowdsourcing Platform Prolific© (Prolific, 
Oxford, UK). The participants who took part in experiment via Prolific were rewarded 2.70£ 
for their participation and the participants who participated via the University of Fribourg 
received 30 minutes in experimental points. Before taking part in the experiment, all 
participants had to give their informed consent. On average participants needed 26 minutes to 
complete the experiment.  
b. Materials 
We used a series of 40 short dialogues about various societal and political topics, as in 
Schumann et al. (2019). The same structure was applied to all dialogues: the first statement was 
always uttered by a person called Barbara and the second statement was a reply to Barbara’s 
statement, expressed by someone called Alexander. As illustrated in (1), the first statement 
uttered by Barbara contained a standpoint in the first segment “It is crucial to better support 
young parents”. The second segment “having a child means a lot of financial charges” was 
always introduced with the causal connective ‘because’ and expressed an argument in support 
of the standpoint.  
(8) Barbara: It is crucial to better support young parents because having a child means 
having a lot of financial responsibility. 
Barbara: Il est crucial de mieux soutenir les jeunes parents parce qu’avoir un enfant 
signifie beaucoup de charges financières. 
Barbara’s part in the dialogue did not vary throughout the different experimental conditions. 
Alexander always introduced the second half of the dialogue which contained the tested 
variables and could appear in four different conditions. In the first condition illustrated in (9) 
the fallacious argument is introduced with a connective. The statement contains a possible 
consequence of the argument given by Barbara “Let’s raise the family allowance”. The first 
segment of Alexander’s response was kept constant in all four conditions. Segment 1 was then 
followed by the causal connective which introduced a distorted version of the argument 
expressed by Barbara (“it only is about the money”). 
(9) Alexander: Let’s raise the family allowance CONNECTIVE it only is about the 
money. 
Alexandre: Augmentons les allocations familiales CONNECTIVE on ne pense qu’à 
l’argent. 
The second condition illustrated in (10) represents the exact same sentence, but this time the 
causal relation between the segments remains implicit, meaning that the fallacious arguments 
is simply juxtaposed to the previous segment. 
(10) Alexander: Let’s raise the family allowance. It only is about the money. 
Alexandre: Augmentons les allocations familiales. On ne pense qu’à l’argent. 
The third experimental condition illustrated in (11) contains a non-fallacious reformulation of 
the argument given by Barbara, and it is introduced by a connective. 
(11) Alexander: Let’s raise the family allowance CONNECTIVE the parents are under 
economic pressure. 
Alexandre: Augmentons les allocations familiales CONNECTIVE les parents sont 
sous pression économique. 
The last condition illustrated in (12) is the same sentence as in (11), but in this case the non-
fallacious reformulation is juxtaposed to the previous segment without any connective. 
(12) Alexander: Let’s raise the family allowance. The parents are under economic pressure. 
Alexandre: Augmentons les allocations familiales. Les parents sont sous pression 
économique. 
In order to ensure that every participant only saw one out of the four possible conditions per 
item, we attributed the four possible versions to four different lists using a Latin square design. 
In total the participants read 10 items per condition, 40 dialogues in total. 
c. Procedure 
We used the crowdsourcing platform Qualtrics© (Qualtrics LLC, Provo: Utah, USA) to set up 
the experiment. The first part of the experiment started with some short preliminary 
instructions. The participants were told that they would have to read 40 short dialogues about 
different societal topics between Barbara and Alexander and that they had to respond to 4 
questions for every dialogue. These instructions were followed by a few demographic questions 
about gender, age, native language, and place of residence. In order to familiarize the 
participants with the task, they were first presented with two trial dialogues. After that, the 
participants moved on to the actual experimental task. They had to read the 40 dialogues 
appearing in a randomized order. The participants were asked to respond to 4 questions on a 6-
point Likert scale ranging from “No, absolutely not” to “Yes, absolutely”. An additional option 
(“I don’t know”) was included in case the participants were not able or not willing to respond 
to the questions. The first two questions illustrated in (13) and (14) focused on two core features 
of the straw man fallacy. The first question assessed the exaggerative nature of the straw man. 
This question was asked in order to investigate if the participants were able to detect cases in 
which Alexander expressed more extreme positions containing straw men.  
(13) Is the conclusion reached by Alexander proportionate to what Barbara has said? 
The second question aimed at the perceived logical link between the statements. This question 
was used to assess whether participants were able to spot the incoherence between the 
statements when the connective announcing attributive content was followed by a fallacious 
argument that did not endorse the content originally expressed by the speaker. 
(14) Does the conclusion reached by Alexander logically follow from what Barbara has 
said? 
The third question illustrated in (15) and the fourth question illustrated in (16) targeted the 
agreement with both speakers.  
(15) Do you agree with Alexander? 
(16) Do you agree with Barbara? 
Answers to the question targeting the agreement with Alexander were expected to be influenced 
by the nature of the argument (non-fallacious or fallacious). Indeed, if participants have spotted 
the fallacy, agreement should be lower for the fallacious reformulations. The question targeting 
the agreement with Barbara was asked as a control question. In this case, we expected 
participants to respond according to their own beliefs and opinions, since Barbara’s statements 
did not contain any manipulated variable.  
d. Analysis 
We performed 2x2 repeated measure ANOVA with two within-subject factors (fallacious or 
non-fallacious argument; present or absent connective) on the data. One separate analysis was 
performed for each connective. Only answers given on the six-point scale were included in the 
analysis. When participants chose the additional option (“I don’t know”), their answer was 
treated as missing data. All connectives were analyzed with the same procedure. 
e. Results for since and puisque 
In Table 2, we report the means and standard deviation for each condition. 
Table 2: Results for experiment 1a (since) and 2a (puisque) 
 Since Puisque 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Question 1 targeting the proportion: 
Fallacious argument with connective 
Fallacious argument without connective 
Non-fallacious argument with connective 
Non-fallacious argument without connective 
 
3.58 
3.65 
4.43 
4.54 
 
0.81 
0.78 
0.71 
0.63 
 
3.09 
3.35 
4.07 
4.07 
 
0.76 
0.74 
0.66 
0.72 
Question 2 targeting the logical link: 
Fallacious argument with connective 
Fallacious argument without connective 
Non-fallacious argument with connective 
Non-fallacious without connective 
 
3.64 
3.79 
4.47 
4.59 
 
0.73 
0.74 
0.67 
0.61 
 
3.54 
3.82 
4.17 
4.27 
 
0.71 
0.65 
0.59 
0.64 
Question 3 targeting the agreement with Alexander: 
Fallacious argument with connective 
Fallacious argument without connective 
Non-fallacious argument with connective 
Non-fallacious argument without connective 
 
3.49 
3.53 
4.46 
4.63 
 
0.7 
0.74 
0.51 
0.65 
 
3.16 
3.44 
4.19 
4.40 
 
0.74 
0.69 
0.65 
0.58 
Question 4 targeting the agreement with Barbara: 
Fallacious argument with connective 
Fallacious argument without connective 
Non-fallacious argument with connective 
Non-fallacious argument without connective 
 
4.46 
4.53 
4.69 
4.77 
 
0.63 
0.69 
0.54 
0.54 
 
4.35 
4.45 
4.59 
4.65 
 
0.58 
0.69 
0.55 
0.51 
 
For the first question targeting the exaggerative nature of the straw man, we report a significant 
effect on the type of argument for the connective since: non-fallacious arguments (M = 4.49) 
are rated as more acceptable than fallacious ones (M = 3.62) [F1(1,41) = 66.63, p < 0.001; 
F2(1,39) = 68.47, p < 0.001]. No effect was found for the presence of absence of the connective 
since [F1(1,41) = 1.664, p = 0.2; F2(1,39) = 1.78, p = 0.19]. For the connective puisque, we 
found a similar pattern. First, fallacious arguments (M = 3.22) were less accepted than non-
fallacious arguments (M = 4.07) [F1(1,40) = 122.52, p < 0.001; F2 (1,39) = 72,43, p < 0.001]. 
Second, sentences with puisque were not less accepted compared to sentences without 
connective, even though the difference approaches significance in both analyses [F1 (1,40) = 
4.3, p = 0.05; F2 (1,39) = 3.1, p = 0.09]. 
The results on the second question, targeting the logical link, returned two main effects for the 
connective since. First, participants rated the non-fallacious arguments as more acceptable 
(M = 4.54) compared to fallacious ones (M = 3.72) [F1(1,41) = 96.07, p < 0.001; F2(1,39) 
= 75.72, p < 0.001]. Second, arguments were more accepted when the causal relation was left 
implicit (M = 4.2) rather than introduced by since (M = 4.06) [F1(1,41) = 96.07, p = 0.02; 
F2(1,39) = 4.14, p = 0.05]. We also report two significant effects for the connective puisque. 
First, participants rated the non-fallacious arguments as more acceptable (M = 4.22) compared 
to fallacious arguments (M = 3.68) [F1 (1,40) = 47.9, p < 0.001; F2 (1,39) = 39.7, p < 0.001]. 
Second, arguments were more accepted when the causal relation was left implicit (M = 4.05) 
rather than introduced by puisque (M = 3.86) [F1 (140) = 10.09, p = 0.003; F2 (1,39) = 7.97, 
p = 0.007]. 
On the third question, with since, the analysis returned a significant effect for the nature of the 
argument. Fallacious argument scored a lower acceptability (M = 3.51) compared to non-
fallacious ones (M = 4.55) [F1(1,41) = 96.53, p <0001; F2(1,39) = 68.78, p < 0.001]. By 
contrast, the presence or absence of since did not affect the scores significantly (F2) [F1(1,41) 
= 2.1, p = 0.155; F2(1,39) = 4.09, p = 0.05]. With puisque, the analysis also returned a 
significant effect for the nature of the argument. Again, fallacious arguments (M = 3.3) are less 
accepted than non-fallacious ones (M = 4.3) [F1(1,40) = 95.82, p < 0.001; F2(1,39) = 85.77, p 
< 0.001]. Contrary to since, the analysis also returned a significant effect for the use or non-use 
of the connective. Agreements were higher when the relation was implicit (M = 3.92) than when 
it was introduced by puisque (M = 3.68) [F1(1,40) = 8.08, p = 0.01; F2(1,39) = 13.01, p = 
0.001]. 
Finally, for the last question targeting the agreement with Barbara, the analysis returned a 
significant effect for the type of argument with since. Participants rated non-fallacious 
arguments are more acceptable (M = 4.73) compared to fallacious ones (M = 4.5) [F1(1,41) = 
13.15, p = 0.001; F2 (1,39) = 18.05, p <0001]. No effect was found for the presence or absence 
of since [F1(1,41) = 1.18, p = 0.28; F2(1,39) = 1.07, p = 0.31]. For puisque, we also found a 
main effect for the nature of the argument, as non-fallacious versions were better accepted 
(M = 4.62) than fallacious ones (M = 4.4) [F1(1,40) = 12.5, p = 0.001; F2(1,39) = 13.02, 
p = 0.001]. No effect was found for the presence or absence of puisque [F1(1,40) = 1.77, 
p = 0.19; F2(1,39) = 1.11, p = 0.3] 
f. Results for given that and étant donné que 
The means and standard deviations of each condition are reported in Table 3. 
Table 3: Results for experiment 1b (given that) and 2b (étant donné que) 
 Given that Étant donné que 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Question 1 targeting the proportion: 
Fallacious argument with connective 
Fallacious argument without connective 
Non-fallacious argument with connective 
Non-fallacious argument without connective 
 
3.63 
3.6 
4.45 
4.58 
 
0.8 
0.77 
0.63 
0.61 
 
3.97 
4.06 
4.68 
4.88 
 
0.9 
0.8 
0.6 
0.6 
Question 2 targeting the logical link: 
Fallacious argument with connective 
Fallacious argument without connective 
Non-fallacious argument with connective 
Non-fallacious without connective 
 
3.83 
3.45 
4.45 
4.62 
 
0.68 
0.77 
0.67 
0.63 
 
4.35 
4.41 
4.74 
4.88 
 
0.73 
0.73 
0.62 
0.61 
Question 3 targeting the agreement with Alexander: 
Fallacious argument with connective 
Fallacious argument without connective 
Non-fallacious argument with connective 
Non-fallacious argument without connective 
 
3.55 
3.61 
4.41 
4.66 
 
0.78 
0.77 
0.6 
0.56 
 
3.99 
3.94 
4.68 
4.88 
 
0.74 
0.77 
0.59 
0.58 
Question 4 targeting the agreement with Barbara: 
Fallacious argument with connective 
Fallacious argument without connective 
Non-fallacious argument with connective 
Non-fallacious argument without connective 
 
4.59 
4.48 
4.67 
4.75 
 
0.61 
0.71 
0.51 
0.5 
 
4.8 
4.8 
4.99 
4.9 
 
0.63 
0.52 
0.49 
0.61 
 
For the first question targeting the exaggerative nature of the straw man, we report a significant 
effect on the type of argument for the connective given that: non-fallacious arguments are rated 
as more acceptable (M = 4.52) compared to non-fallacious ones (M = 3.62) [F1(1,39) = 73.69, 
p < 0.001; F2(1,39) = 65.88]. No effect was found for the presence or absence of given that 
[F1(1,39) = 0.49, p = 0.49; F2(1,39) = 0, p = 0.99]. For the connective étant donné que, two 
main effects were found. First, the acceptability was lower for fallacious arguments (M = 4.02) 
compared to non-fallacious ones (M = 4.78) [F1(1,40) = 71.37, p < 0.001; F2 (1,39) = 57.34, 
p < 0.001]. Second, implicit relations were rated as more acceptable (M = 4.5) than arguments 
introduced by étant donné que (M = 4.33) [F1(1,40) = 6.05, p < 0.05; F2(1,39) = 7.74, p < 
0.01]. 
Results on the second question targeting the logical link between the statements indicated a 
preference for non-fallacious over fallacious arguments. For given that, non-fallacious 
arguments were rater higher (M = 4.54) compared to fallacious ones (M = 3.82) [F1(1,39) = 
81.29, p < 0.001; F2(1,39) = 43.95, p < 0.001]. However, the analysis returned no effect for the 
presence or absence of the connective given that [F1(1,39) = 1.33, p = 0.26; F2(1,39) = 0.38, 
p = 0.54]. The results for the French version with étant donné que returned a significant effect 
with a higher score for non-fallacious (M = 4.81) over fallacious arguments (M = 4.38) 
[F1(1,40) = 38.46, p < 0001; F2(1,39) = 24.54, p < 0.001]. As in English, the analysis returned 
no effect for the presence or absence of the connective étant donné que, even though the results 
approached significance in both analyses [F1(1,40) = 3.96, p = 0.053; F2(1,39) = 3.25, p = 
0.08]. 
On the question targeting the agreement with Alexander, the results showed a main effect on 
the type of argument for given that. Again, participants preferred non-fallacious (M = 4.53) 
over fallacious arguments (M = 3.58) [F1(1,39) = 102.65, p <0.001; F2(1,39) = 49.76, p < 
0.001]. The presence or absence of given that did not result in a significant difference [F1(1,39) 
= 3.76, p = 0.6; F2(1,39) = 3.37, p = 0.74]. Results on the connective étant donné que show a 
significant difference for the nature of the argument. Non-fallacious arguments (M = 4.78) were 
rated as more acceptable compared to fallacious arguments (M = 3.97) [F1(1,40) = 105.57, p < 
0.001; F2(1,39) = 55.13, p < 0.001]. The presence or absence of étant donné que did not produce 
a significant difference either [F1(1,40) = 1.04, p = 0.32; F2(1,39) = 1.55, p = 0.22]. 
Finally, on the agreement with Barbara, the analysis did not return any effect for the type of 
argument with given that [F1(1,39) = 3.91, p = 0.06; F2(1,39) = 2.81, p = 0.1], nor for the 
presence or absence of the connective [F1(1,39) = 0.12, p = 0.73; F2(1,39) = 0.08, p = 0.78]. 
No significant effect was found either for étant donné que on the type of argument [F1(1,40) = 
3.63, p = 0.06; F2(1,39) = 3.87, p = 0.06], or on the presence or absence of the connective 
[F1(1,40) = 0.66, p = 0.42; F2(1,39) = 0.54, p = 0.47]. 
g. Results for as and comme 
Table 4 reports the means and standard deviation for all conditions. 
Table 4: Results for experiment 1c (as) and 2c (comme) 
 As Comme Mean SD Mean SD 
Question 1 targeting the proportion: 
Fallacious argument with connective 
Fallacious argument without connective 
Non-fallacious argument with connective 
Non-fallacious argument without connective 
 
3.68 
3.59 
4.57 
4.59 
 
0.74 
0.68 
0.63 
0.54 
 
3.45 
3.59 
4.49 
4.45 
 
0.63 
0.79 
0.71 
0.75 
Question 2 targeting the logical link: 
Fallacious argument with connective 
Fallacious argument without connective 
Non-fallacious argument with connective 
Non-fallacious without connective 
 
3.72 
3.75 
4.53 
4.58 
 
0.71 
0.71 
0.62 
0.55 
 
4.07 
4.14 
4.56 
4.62 
 
0.63 
0.72 
0.61 
0.63 
Question 3 targeting the agreement with Alexander: 
Fallacious argument with connective 
Fallacious argument without connective 
Non-fallacious argument with connective 
Non-fallacious argument without connective 
 
3.54 
3.45 
4.56 
4.58 
 
0.64 
0.64 
0.57 
0.67 
 
3.51 
3.53 
4.52 
4.47 
 
0.69 
0.59 
0.56 
0.72 
Question 4 targeting the agreement with Barbara: 
Fallacious argument with connective 
Fallacious argument without connective 
Non-fallacious argument with connective 
Non-fallacious argument without connective 
 
4.61 
4.64 
4.76 
4.78 
 
0.56 
0.59 
0.61 
0.56 
 
4.76 
4.71 
4.86 
4.92 
 
0.52 
0.57 
0.51 
0.6 
 
For the first question targeting the exaggerative nature of the straw man, we report a significant 
effect on the type of argument for the connective as. Fallacious arguments (M = 3.64) are less 
accepted than non-fallacious ones (M = 4.58) [F1(1,40) = 100.46, p < 0.001; F2(1,39) = 80.62, 
p < 0.001]. The presence or absence of as did not result in a significant effect [F1(1,40) = 0.25, 
p = 0.62; F2(1,39) = 0.36, p = 0.55]. The French connective comme led to similar results. There 
was a significant effect for the nature of the argument, as non-fallacious arguments (M = 4.47) 
led to higher acceptance rates than fallacious ones (M = 3.53) [F1(1,39) = 102.44, p < 0.001; 
F2(1,39) = 56.74, p < 0.001]. The presence or absence of comme did not return any effects 
either [F1(1,39) = 0.55, p = 0.46; F2(1,39) = 0.33, p = 0.57]. 
We find the same pattern on the second question targeting the logical link between the 
statements. Again, for as, responses to non-fallacious arguments reached a higher score 
(M = 4.56) compared to fallacious arguments (M = 3.74) [F1(1,40) = 101.37, p < 0.001; 
F2(1,39) = 66.18, p < 0.001]. The presence or absence of as did not lead to a significant 
difference [F1(1,40) = 0.34, p = 0.57; F2(1,39) = 0.35, p = 0.56]. The results for the connective 
comme did return a significant effect for the type of argument. Again, fallacious arguments 
(M = 4.11) led to a lower acceptability score than non-fallacious ones (M = 4.59) [F1(1,39) = 
43.33, p < 0.001; F2(1,39) = 30.45, p < 0.001]. No effect was found for the presence or absence 
of comme [F1(1,39) = 1.65, p = 0.21; F2(1,39) = 1.06, p = 0.31]. 
The results for as on the third question targeting the agreement with Alexander show a 
significant difference for the nature of the argument. Participants gave higher acceptance scores 
to non-fallacious arguments (M = 4.57) compared to fallacious ones (M = 3.5) [F1(1,40) = 
121.62, p < 0.001; F2(1,39) = 68.8, p < 0.001]. The results on the presence or absence of as did 
not return any results [F1(1,40) = 0.23, p = 0.63; F2(1,39) = 0.23, p = 0.63]. The same pattern 
was found for the connective comme. The results showed a main effect on the type of argument, 
with non-fallacious arguments (M = 4.5) leading to a higher acceptance rate compared to 
fallacious ones (M = 3.52) [F1(1,39) = 104.73, p < 0.001; F2(1,39) = 62.31, p < 0.001]. The 
presence or absence of comme did yield a significant difference [F1(1,39) = 0.03, p = 0.86; 
F2(1,39) = 0.02, p = 0.88]. 
Finally, for the agreement with Barbara, results showed a similar pattern. Again, participants 
gave a higher acceptance score to non-fallacious (M = 4.77) compared to fallacious ones 
(M = 4.63) [F1(1,40 = 5.06, p = 0.03; F2(1,39) = 5.88, p = 0.02]. The presence or absence of 
the connective as did not create a significant difference [F1(1,40) = 0.24, p = 0.627; 
F2(1,39) = 0.57, p = 0.46]. Results for the connective comme returned the same pattern. 
Participants gave a higher score to non-fallacious arguments (M = 4.89) compared to fallacious 
ones (M = 4.73) [F1(1,39) = 6.29, p = 0.02; F2(1,39) = 7.15, p = 0.01]. The presence or absence 
of comme did not create a significant effect [F1(1,39) = 0.01, p = 0.91; F2(1,39) = 0.31, p = 
0.58]. 
h. Discussion 
Results from our experiments clearly indicate that participants are intuitively able to detect 
fallacies: in all six experiments, they systematically rated non-fallacious statements as more 
acceptable compared to fallacious ones. In addition, the effects were always significant for the 
first three questions targeting the exaggerative nature of the straw man, the logical link between 
the statements and the agreement with Alexander. This is due to the fact that, in all three cases, 
the answers were influenced by the manipulated variables. By contrast, the question targeting 
the agreement with Barbara, sometimes led to a significant difference and sometimes not. This 
result was expected since answers to this question vary depending on the personal opinion of 
each participant (whether they agree with her standpoint or not) and should therefore not be 
influenced by the manipulated variables. 
More critically for the argument of this paper, we also observed different patterns of effects 
related to the uses of connectives. A summary of the effects created by the six connectives in 
each of the four questions is presented in Table 5. In this table, “yes” means that a significant 
difference was found, always in the direction of a lower acceptability when the connective was 
used compared to the implicit version, and “no” means that no significant difference was found. 
The tag “fuzzy” was used when the analysis approached significance in both F1 and F2, and 
the lack of effect could therefore be due to lack of statistical power. 
Table 5: Summary of significant effects created by each connective. 
 Exaggeration Logical link Agreement with A Agreement with B 
since No Yes No No 
puisque Fuzzy Yes Yes No 
given that No No No No 
étant donné que Yes Fuzzy No No 
as No No No No 
comme No No No No 
First, our results indicate that the connective puisque does indeed function as a forewarner and 
leads the participants to be more vigilant regarding the segment following it. When the 
argument introduced by puisque is of a fallacious nature, reader expectations are not met 
because puisque instructs the reader to consider the content following the connective as given 
information whereas the attributed content is not faithful in the case of a straw man fallacy. 
These findings are in line with the forewarning effect put forward by Kamalski et al. (2008), 
showing that strongly subjective connectives act as indicators that the speakers’ own 
subjectivity is at play. This effect was moreover found on two and even the three critical 
questions in our experiment. By contrast, its English “counterpart” since did not create such a 
clear effect, as it only gave rise to a significant difference in one of the questions, targeting the 
logical link between segments. Hence, our results provide some further indication that even 
closely related connectives in different languages do not function in a similar way, and this 
impacts their role in persuasive contexts. Similarly, étant donné que in French creates a stronger 
effect as a forewarner compared to given that in English.  
Given that puisque and since are both rated as strongly subjective connectives in current 
analyses, it is not clear what could explain these differences, as the forewarning effect was 
specifically related to this feature. Our data indicates therefore that subjectivity is not the only 
feature that is relevant to explain the role of connectives for argumentation. We suggest that an 
alternative explanation could be the type of speaker attitude towards the attributed content. It 
has been argued that puisque conveys a tacitly dissociative attitude (Zufferey, 2014). It might 
well be that this feature is what sets this connective apart from the others. Future work will need 
to explore this feature using corpus data to empirically assess the validity of this hypothesis. 
Another limitation from existing literature is that étant donné que and given that do not seem 
to have a variable profile in the databases of connectives, yet they do not play a similar role as 
forewarners. Again, this result points to the necessity of identifying additional features and also 
of getting a more fine-grained picture of their profile using corpus data. The last pair made of 
comme and as create the reverse problem. They seem this time to play a similar role for 
argumentation, given that none of them plays a role a forewarner. Yet, their profile is partly 
divergent in current databases of connectives. This result underlines again the necessity to go 
beyond coarse-grained classifications of connectives to get an empirically based profile of each 
connective in all these dimensions (subjectivity, givenness, speaker attitude). We have provided 
such an analysis for French connectives in Schumann, Zufferey & Oswald (submitted), and 
results clearly indicate that corpus-based analyses of connectives are much more accurate as 
predictors of their argumentative effects.  Indeed, in this analysis, we found that puisque has a 
higher degree of subjectivity compared to étant donné que, which has in turn a higher degree 
of subjectivity compared to comme. Similarly, puisque is more often used to convey given 
information compared to étant donné que, which is in turn more used to convey given 
information compared to comme. Thus, the scaling of connectives is convergent on both 
dimensions: puisque > étant donné que > comme. In addition, this profile drawn based on corpus 
data perfectly matches the strength with which all three connectives affect argumentation. A 
similar analysis will need to be performed on cross-linguistic data in future work in order to 
further deepen our understanding of the role of connectives in argumentation. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, our goal was to illustrate the role of connectives for argumentation. Going beyond 
the coarse-grained classification of discourse markers found in some works in argumentation, 
we argued that the fine-grained analysis found in pragmatics and discourse studies provide more 
indications about the role of connectives as forewarners in argumentative contexts. We 
demonstrated in a series of experiments conducted on three French and three English causal 
connectives that connectives do not always play a similar role in argumentation. First, our 
experiments showed that the presence or absence of some connectives does indeed play a 
significant role for the communication of fallacies. When the fallacious argument is introduced 
with a strongly subjective connective most often used to convey given information with a tacitly 
dissociative attitude (i.e. puisque), participants score lower acceptability rates which confirms 
the results from our previous work (Schumann et al., 2019) and adds credit to the forewarning 
effect reported by Kamalski et al. (2008). However, important differences are to be mentioned 
within the same language and across languages which begs the need for more fine-grained 
studies of specific connectives. In sum, the experiments presented in this paper show the 
necessity of a precise and more fine-grained investigation of connectives in order to understand 
their impact on fallacies and argumentation in general. 
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